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"ZONING IMAGINATION" - DIMENSIONAL
ZONING
EUGENE J. MORRIS*
The twentieth century concepts of air rights, landmarks preserva-
tion and zoning are currently converging to engender a wholly new
form of urban land use regulation -dimensional zoning, i.e., zoning
in terms of both space' and time.2
Space zoning deals with the technique of transferring zoning or
development rights from one site to another, usually in densely occu-
pied urban areas.3 This occurs where the transferor site (having a build-
ing underutilizing its maximum zoning potential4) conveys to the
transferee site (one in process of development) all or a portion of its
unused potential zoning capacity, which would otherwise lie fallow.
Once it is established that, in this manner, air rights (zoning capacity)
can be conveyed independently of the land to which it is appurtenant,5
a host of new procedures may develop out of traditional doctrines of
common-law conveyancing, 6 which may then be employed by imagina-
tive developers to increase the utilization of scarce urban space within
the framework of existing zoning laws. One such new procedure (which
will be discussed later in this article) is where development rights or
zoning rights may be transferred, swapped, condemned or leased all
over town under government supervision in the form of a "zoning
bank".7
* Chairman, ABA Special Committee on the Federal Navigation Servitude, Section of
Real Property, Probate and Trust Law, Chairman, ABA Special Committee on Housing
and Urban Development Law, Chairman, Assoc. of Bar of the City of New York Commit-
tee on Housing and Urban Development Law. B.S.S., City University of New York, 1931;
LL.B., St. John's Univ. 1934.
1"Space" zoning is defined to mean the transference of zoning air rights from one
parcel to another.
2 "Time" zoning is defined to mean the establishment of a timetable for the orderly
development of a specified area.
3 Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip and Jump, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1970,
§ 8 at 1, col. 1.
4 Examples of this are the Appellate Division Court House; the United States Custom
House in New York; the Stock Exchange in Chicago.
5 Pearson v. Matheson, 102 S.C. 377, 86 S.E. 1063 (1915); R.M. Cobban Realty Co. v.
Donlan, 51 Mont. 58, 149 P. 484 (1915); Taft v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 127 Wash.
503, 221 P. 604 (1923).
0 Morris, Air Rights are 'Fertile Soil; 1 THE URBAN LAWYER 247, 261 (1969) [herein-
after Morris].
7The "zoning bank," where unused air rights over buildings are placed in the so-
called bank to be sold to developers to increase their zoned floor-area ratio, was first pro-
posed by Professor John Costonis as a way to preserve Chicago landmarks. Costonis &
Shlaes, The Chicago Landmarks Dilemma: A Proposed Legislative Response, Jan. 6, 1971;
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The same imaginative approach may be employed to encompass
zoning in time as well as in space. Thus, where it is inappropriate for
development to occur at a particular point in time, but where it is well
known that development will eventually become appropriate in a man-
ner consistent with the orderly growth of the community, time factors
may be introduced into the zoning syndrome and thus foster orderly
and controlled growth.3
This concept of time zoning has been enacted in the Town of
Ramapo, New York, by controlling not only what can be built but
when it can be built.9 The statute regulating the "time zoning" calls
for a system whereby no property can be built upon until it amasses a
specified number of points assigned for capital improvements, 0 which
consist of sewer lines to the property, sidewalks, drainage capacity, and
the like. However, in Ramapo the cost of these improvements plus the
real estate taxes, which were recently increased radically, made it eco-
nomically unfeasible for most developers to construct housing. In order
to avoid the abandonment of the property, the new ordinance provided
for the creation of a Development Easement Acquisition Commission
which allowed developers to bank their land for periods of up to ten
years, during which period the developer would receive a 95% tax
abatement. 1 In this way the Town of Ramapo was able to control the
influx of new residents and avoid the strain on public services.
The idea of time zoning is not a new one, and has been proposed
as a means of orderly growth for many years. 12 However, the legislation
enacted by some of the cities and towns to time their growth has been
held to be void as an abuse of power, discriminatory, lacking confor-
mity, etc.13 As can be seen in the Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax
County v. Carper,'4 the legislation affected only one area of the town,
while the other area was allowed uncontrolled and unmetered growth.
Costonis & Shlaes, Preservation of Chicago Landmarks Through a Development Rights
Banking Program, Dec. 4, 1970 (unpublished memoranda on file at Demov, Morris, Levin
& Shein, N.Y., N.Y.).
8In the Matter of Golden v. Planning Board of Town of Ramapo, 167 N.Y.L.J. 95,
May 16, 1972, at 1, col. 7; Oser, Innovator in Suburbs Under Fire, N.Y. Times, Mar. 28,
1971, § 8, at 1, col. 3.
9Id.
10 Oser, supra note 8, at 6, col. 2.
11 Id. at 6, col. 6.
12 Mandelker, Book Review, 61 MicH. L. RFv. 628 (1963); Fagin, Regulating the Tim-
ing of Urban Development, 20 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 298 (1955).
18 Board of County Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Carpar, 200 Va. 653, 107 SE.2d
390 (1959); Albrecht Realty Co. v. Town of New Castle, 8 Misc. 2d 255, 167 N.Y.S.2d 843
(1957).
14 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
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The court held that although the rapid population growth had created
strains on the city services:
The effect of the amendment has been to permit a person to build
on a lot of less than two acres, while denying his neighbor the right
to build unless he puts his house on a lot containing a minimum
of two acres. It lacks uniformity.15
This situation is avoided in the Town of Ramapo, since Ramapo
does not deny anybody the right to build, in that developers must all
meet the requirements of the ordinances equally, i.e., the point system.
Once this is met, any developer may commence construction. Of course,
the factor in the Town of Ramapo legislation which makes the whole
concept feasible is the tax abatement when the land is placed in the
bank. During this time developers can utilize their money, otherwise
spent on taxes, to meet their capital improvements requirements, and
at the same time, help Ramapo control the timing of construction and
the growth of the town.
Space zoning, dealing with the transference of air rights is a rela-
tively new concept. The first tentative steps toward opening the door to
these radical land use concepts in zoning occurred when an ingenious
developer, recognizing that the new building he was contemplating could
be much more profitable if it were larger, cast a covetous eye upon an
adjacent site with a small building on it, which underutilized its maxi-
mum floor area ratio zoning. The developer bought the parcel, leased
the building back to the former owner and by merging the two separate
zoning lots into one so that the total zoning envelope would encompass
the new combined lot, increased the maximum permissible size of his
new building. The merging of ownership entitled the new owner to the
total of the allowable zoning for the two previously separate lots, as in
any assemblage for development purposes. 16 From this conventional
practice, it is merely the next logical step to the idea of a "zoning bank"
where air rights are traded back and forth by developers (with munic-
ipal sanction)17 much like investors on Wall Street trade futures in
commodities.
The intermediate steps in this evolution are already well along in
some cities'8 and it is inevitable that the zoning bank will become as
15 Id. at 659, 107 S.E2d at 396.
16 N.Y.C. ZomNG RESOLUTION §§ 12-10, 33-11 (1971).
17 In New York City, an analogous situation occurred, where §§ 74-79 and 74-792
were added to the Zoning Resolution to allow the transfer of air rights from one parcel
to another.
18 The New York Resolution reads:
Transfer of Development Rights from Landmark Sites for the purpose of this sec-
1972]
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widely accepted in the future as its underlying concepts- air rights
conveyancing and landmarks preservation. 19
The most basic of these techniques is the ordinary sale and lease-
back where an existing building (frequently a landmark) fails to em-
ploy its full zoning rights.20 Under this technique, certain contractual
requirements are incorporated into the instruments of conveyance to
limit the future use of the property to less than the maximum permit-
ted use under the prevailing zoning; thereafter the unused zoning or
development rights may be transferred. For example, if the total floor
area allowed under the zoning code for joined lots is 200,000 square
feet, and a proposed building will use 150,000 square feet, the original
building would be prohibited from being enlarged to more than its
existing 50,000 square feet even though the zoning governing the lot
on which it stands would allow more. A typical clause in such a sale
and leaseback arrangement might read as follows:
Tenant may erect a new building or elevate the existing build-
ing on the Demised Premises to a height of not more than 108 feet
from curb level provided, however, that in no event shall said new
tion, the term "adjacent lot" shall mean a lot which is contiguous to the lot oc-
cupied by the landmark building or one which is across a street and opposite to
the lot occupied by the landmark building, or, in the case of a corner lot, one
which fronts on the same street intersection as the lot occupied by the landmark
building; it shall also mean.... a lot contiguous or one which is across a street
and opposite to another lot or lots which except for the intervention of streets
or street intersections form a series extending to the lot occupied by the land-
mark building. All such lots shall be in the same ownership (fee ownership or
ownership as defined under zoning lot in Section 12-10). A "landmark building"
shall include any structure designated as a landmark by the Landmarks Preserva-
tion Commission and the Board of Estimate pursuant to Chapter 8-A of the New
York City Charter and Chapter 8-A of the New York City Administrative Code,
but shall not include public parks, any structures within public parks, or historic
districts, those portions of zoning lots used for cemetery purposes, statutes, monu-
ments and bridges, [or any structures owned by or on land owned by City, State
or Federal governments or their agencies].
Id. § 74-79.
Conditions and Limitations
5. As a condition of permitting such transfers or development rights, the
Commission shall make the following findings:
(a) that the permitted transfer of floor area or variations in the front
height and setback regulations will not unduly increase the bulk of any
new development, density of population or intensity of use in any block,
to the detriment of the occupants of buildings on the block or nearby
blocks and
(b) that the program for continuing maintenance will result in the pres-
ervation of the landmark.
(c) That in the case of landmark sites owned by the City, State or Fed-
eral Government, transfer of development rights shall be contingent upon
provision by the applicant of a major improvement of the public pedes-
trian circulation or transportation system in the area.
Id. § 74-792.
19 Costonis & Shlaes, The Chicago Landmarks Dilemma; A Proposed Legislative Re-
sponse, Jan. 6, 1971; Costonis & Shlaes, Preservation of Chicago Landmarks through a
Development Rights Banking Program, Dec. 4, 1970.
20The New York Appellate Division Court House on Madison Avenue and 25th
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building be erected or the existing building elevated to the afore-
said height unless the same is permitted by the zoning laws and all
other applicable statutes, laws, ordinances, rules and regulations of
the governmental authorities having jurisdiction affecting the De-
mised Premises in conjunction with the Office Building premises;
and complies with any then existing Certificate of Occupancy for
said Office Building premises and will not make illegal the use and
existence (or, prior to the construction of the proposed Office Build-
ing, the proposed use and proposed existence) of all or any portion
of said Office Building premises.
One area in which air space utilization has been particularly im-
portant is that of the development of highway and railroad rights-of-
way.21 Grand Central Station and the buildings facing Park Avenue are
constructed on the space over the tracks and yards of the Penn-
Central Railroad. In Chicago, the Daily News Building, the Merchan-
dise Mart (which was, for a time, the largest office building in the
world), and the Prudential Building were all built over railroad rights-
of-way.22
More recently, airspace above highways has also been extensively
developed, largely encouraged by the 1961 amendment to the Federal-
Aid Highway Act enabling the states or other political subdivisions to
use or permit the use of airspace by others "for such purposes as will
not impair the full use and safety of the highway." 23 Congress, in recog-
nizing the need of airspace development over highways, enacted the
Urban Mass Transportation Act,24 the High Speed Ground Transpor-
tation Act 25 and the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Develop-
ment Program Act.26 A further amendment to the Federal-Aid Highway
Act requiring consideration of the social and economic effects of a high-
way in relation to its impact on the environment and on the commu-
nity's urban planning27 gave further impetus to the utilization of
highway airspace. Amendments to the Transportation Act28, the Dem-
onstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Program Act29, and
the High-Speed Ground Transportation Act", also take into consider-
Street in New York City recently concluded such an agreement; See also Newport Associ-
ates, Inc. v. Solow, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1972).
21 WMIGHT, THE LAW OF ARsPACE 382 (1968).
22 MAorris, supra note 6, at 248.
2323 U.S.C. § 111 (1970).
2449 US.C. §§ 1601-11 (1970).
2549 U.S.C. §§ 1631-42 (1970).
2642 U.S.C. §§ 3301-74 (1970).
2723 U.S.C. § 128(a) (1970).
2849 U.S.C. §§ 1603(a), 1607, 16 53(g) (1970).
29 42 US.C. §§ 3332, 37 (1970).
8049 U.S.C. § 1639 (1970).
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ation the comprehensive development plans of the states and munici-
palities. Thus, in New York four 32-story apartment buildings today
stand on top of the approaches to the George Washington Bridge in
upper Manhattan.
In utilizing the airspace over a highway or railroad it is seldom
necessary to acquire title in fee to the land over which the new structure
is placed. Often, it is more advantageous to acquire only an easement
instead.81 In some states, the purchase of title in fee simple is autho-
rized, but one can obtain only an easement by condemnation. 2 In more
than ten states, one cannot purchase title in fee simple to air rights and
can acquire only an easement either by purchase or by condemnation. 3
Where the obtaining of the highway right-of-way is by a fee title
purchase, then the problem of granting air rights to build over or un-
der the highway is of little consequence. The same situation, i.e., a
comparatively easy method of granting air rights over public highways,
occurs where the city, state or local government takes the right-of-way
in condemnation.
A major hurdle to air rights development over highways exists
where the right-of-way is obtained only by easement. The underlying
fee to the center of the street remains in the adjoining land owner.84
This obviously gives the fee owner the rights to the air space over the
right-of-way granted for the highway, street, etc. Where a fee situation is
established either by purchase or condemnation, major construction can
proceed on these air rights.
An interesting illustration of this is the Bridge Apartments (re-
ferred to above) over a two-block section of Interstate 95 at the east end
of the George Washington Bridge in New York City.85 The airspace
for the buildings (which are completed) sold for over one million
dollars. 0
81 This easement is purely for the support of the air rights structure. The air rights,
themselves, are held in fee.
82 An easement by condemnation is where a condemnation takes place to acquire the
subjacent supports for the air rights structure.
as WIcHT, THF LAw OF AIR SPACE 295, n.40, citing Highway Research Board, Special
Report 32 at 9-10. Twenty-eight states acquire both fee titles and easements; one listed
only a fee as the interest acquired, and another listed only an easement as the interest
acquired; Alaska acquires a fee title to private lands and an easement to public land, ac-
cording to the answer submitted. The easement was more common than a fee title in
acquisitions in Missouri and North Carolina. Id. at n.41 (Referring to a questionnaire
completed in 31 states).
84 Recent Developments in Airspace Utilization, 5 REAL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 347,
356 (1970).
35 Id. at 357.




In certain instances easements are granted for the airspace and, al-
though the underlying fee may be vested in a municipality, the ease-
ment creates many problems for the air fights developer. Montefiore
Hospital in New York was faced with such a problem, since although
the City of New York was willing to grant them an easement to build
an airspace structure above the surface of Bainbridge Avenue in the
Bronx, the easement was not mortgageable due to the City's right to
regain control and cancel the easement at will without compensation. 7
Special legislation was enacted by the State Legislature granting Monte-
fiore an easement, which if taken in condemnation just compensation
would have to be paid by the City;38 i.e., a "quasi" condemnation, since,
in reality the City would be condemning its own property -the air-
space over the City street.
The same result may be accomplished by the conveyance of a lease-
hold with a leaseback where the zoning ordinance defines a zoning lot
to include a long-term lease as in the New York Zoning Resolution,
Section 12-109, which provides for a 75-year lease as follows:
For the purposes of this definition, ownership of a zoning lot
shall be deemed to include a lease of not less than 50 years dura-
tion, with an option to renew such lease so as to provide a total
lease of not less than 75 years duration.40
In these cases the building on the leased parcel is subleased back
to the original owner. This is usually for a nominal sum such as one
dollar annually. It must be recognized that the sale and leaseback or the
lease and subleaseback techniques do not involve the sale or lease of
air rights at all - they constitute conveyances of an absolute estate in
the land itself.41
Another technique, which has recently been allowed by the Build-
ing Department of the City of New York and sanctioned by the New
York Court of Appeals on May 2, 1972, involved the owner of the
adjacent parcel obtaining a long term lease and crediting the unused
floor area ratio of the leasehold to the new building being constructed
87 N.Y.C. CArrAMR ch. 14 § 374 (1969).
3S L. 1971, ch. 278, at 382, eff. May 18, 1971 (McKinney 1971); But see L. 1971, ch. 1002,
at-, eff. July 2, 1971 (McKinney 1971), where the New York State Legislature has au-
thorized the outright conveyance of air rights over streets.
s9 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION § 12-10 (1971); See Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow,
- N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1972).
40 Id.
41 The technique is one of selling the adjoining lot with its structures to a developer
who needs the air space. He now has a complete zoning envelope and is entitled to con-
struct a structure with an increased floor area ratio. The developer then leases back the
structure to the seller of the air space. In New York this can now also be done by a lessee
of the adjoining parcel as well as by the owner.
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on the adjacent fee-owned parcels. 42 The Court held that where several
contiguous lots are in single ownership they may be treated as a "zoning
lot" for the purpose of floor area ratio computation and that long term
leasehold interests constitute ownership.8 In states recognizing air rights
for zoning purposes there can, of course, be an absolute conveyance of
the air rights in fee or by lease.44
This technique for the transfer of zoning or development rights
has found one of its most useful functions (in a purely coincidental
manner) in making landmark preservation effective4 5 under circum-
stances where it would otherwise be overwhelmed by the pressures of
land cost escalation and urban expansion. 46 Thus, where a privately-
owned landmark finds itself in the path of rapidly-spiraling land prices
(as most of them necessarily are, otherwise they would not ordinarily
require protection), the owner is subjected to increasing pressure to
sell at a substantial profit 47 and thus destroy the effectiveness of the
landmarks preservation concept. 48 Because of constitutional limitations,
landmarks statutes cannot compel preservation of privately-owned land-
marks where the owner can show that the property is incapable of
realizing an adequate return (usually defined in the statute)49 and
where municipal priorities do not permit the expenditure of scarce
funds for the acquisition of the landmark by the municipality by pur-
chase or condemnation 0 or through the device of a preservation ease-
ment.
These economic exigencies have prevented the preservation of
many outstanding landmarks, such as the old New York Metropolitan
4 2 Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow, - N.Y.2d -, - N.E.2d -, - N.Y.S.2d - (1972).
4 3 Prior to the Court of Appeals decision in Newport v. Solow it was thought that an
absolute conveyance in fee was necessary to convey the zoning benefit. See In re Brausa,
140 N.Y.L.J. 108 (1968).
44 Federal Aid Highway Act of 1961, 23 U.S.C. § 111 (1970). See also Crawford, Some
Legal Aspects of Air Rights and Land Use, 25 FED. B.J. 167 (1965).
CAL. Civ. CoDE § 659 (Deering 1971); CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 118-12-1 (1963); N.J.
REv. STAT. § 46:3-19 (1940).
45 Realty, Sept. 29, 1970. Amster Yard, a New York City landmark, was preserved by the
transferring of its air space to an adjoining parcel of land.4 6 King, 12th-Hour Drive is Made For a Chicago Landmark, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1971,
at 28, col. 2. The Sullivan Stock Exchange in Chicago is a 13-story landmark structure
sitting on a piece of land zoned for a 43-story commercial structure.
47 Realty, Sept. 29, 1970; Burk, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip and jump, N.Y.
Times, April 26, 1970, § 8, at 9, col. 4.
48 King, 12th-Hour Drive is Made For a Chicago Landmark, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15,
1971, at 28, col. 3-4.
49 N.Y.C. CHARTm AND ADMINISTRATIVE CoDE, ch. 8-A § 207-1.0(c), (q) (1971).
50Down Comes a Masterpiece, LIFE, Nov. 5, 1971 at 40. Further, where a city con.
demns, it also loses taxes and must pay maintenance and repair expenses out of its own
budget, which many cities can ill afford, many of them being on the verge of bankruptcy.
[Vol. 46:679
DIMENSIONAL ZONING
Opera House5 and the Manhattan Club52, in New York. In Chicago
a similar situation still exists even after the enactment of the Chicago
Landmarks Ordinance. The inadequacy of Chicago's statute is evi-
denced by the loss of the Stock Exchange Building.53
The approach to zoning or development rights offers a new method
of buttressing the preservation safeguards which have legal sanction in
existing landmarks preservation statutes. "Thus far, the courts have
been receptive to historic preservation laws, sustaining them against
constitutional challenge in language of approbation."5 4 So long as the
statutes have remained a means of achieving legitimate ends, the courts
have upheld them.5
The Constitution imposes 14th Amendment due process limits
here. You cannot take away a man's property for other than a public
purpose, and then only with just compensation, and after due process.
Landmarks legislation must take care to provide for this. Thus, the
owner must be compensated in some way - through subsidy, tax abate-
ment, the right to sell his unused air space - for his otherwise increas-
ingly uneconomical property. This can be accomplished by recognizing
the economic factor in landmarks preservation, and effectuating the
transfer of zoning or development rights at prices commensurate with
then current fair market values.58 In a parcel subject to high land values,
the payment for these rights can be substantial and can serve to counter-
act the influence which has thus far led to landmark destruction.57
Thus, ownership and preservation of the landmark makes economic
sense.
58
The same technique can be applied to landmarks owned by the
government (or to any government-owned facility that does not utilize
its maximum development rights), thereby allowing the public treasury
to acquire some of the benefits to be realized from land values which
51 Keystone v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
52 Manhattan Club v. Landmarks Preservation Comm. 51 Misc. 2d 556, 278 N.Y.S.2d
848 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1966).
53 N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1971, at 82, col. 3 (editorial); The Disposable Sullivans, Time
Magazine (The Nation), Nov. 1, 1971.
54 Comment, The Police Power, Eminent Domain, and the Preservation of Historic
Property, 63 CoLum. L. REv. 708, 732 (1968).
55 Id. citing Whitty v. City of New Orleans, Civil No. 6367, ED. La., October 21, 1951,
appeal dismissed as moot, 276 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1960); City of New Orleans v. Levy, 223
La. 14, 64 So. 2d 798 (1958); City of New Orleans v. Pergament, 198 La. 852, 5 So. 2d
129 (1941); Levin v. Clark, Equity No. 8295, Philadelphia c. P., Oct. 14, 1955.
56 Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip and Jump, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1970,
§ 8, at 1, col. 1; Sher, "Air Rights" Lease, Zoning, 164 N.Y.L.J. 71, Oct. 9, 1970 at 4, col. 8
[hereinafter Sher].
57 N.Y. Times, May 30, 1970, at 22, col. 1 (editorial).
58 N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1971, at 82, col. 3 (editorial).
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are inflating.59 Likewise, conveyance of development rights can assist
in the preservation of open land and green spaces in and about metro-
politan areas, which are disappearing at a rapid rate.60 After all, land
constitutes a fixed commodity; its value inevitably goes up; and the
factory that produced the land has long since closed down. The only
way to produce more space is to build up into the air as we are doing
under our newly evolving air rights concepts of urban development. 61
There are two interesting illustrations of how this is being accom-
plished in New York City.
The first instance deals with the Appellate Division Courthouse,
a landmark building on Madison Avenue and East 25th Street in Man-
hattan. An owner of adjacent land sought to build an office building
of 500,000 square feet floor area. The zoning law would not permit
him to exceed 400,000 square feet on his lot. The then zoning law for-
bade the transfer to him outright of air rights above the courthouse,
because it was a city-owned landmark.62 The solution was for the City
to lease to him for a seventy-five year period the courthouse and the
land on which it stands.63 For this the City will be paid a substantial
rental averaging $46,000 per year.64 Since, as noted above, the Zoning
Resolution defines ownership of a zoning lot as ownership in fee sim-
ple or simply as possession of a seventy-five year leasehold, he is enabled
to combine his two lots, one held in fee and one by lease, into one lot
large enough so that he might build 500,000 square feet of floor area.
At the same time, he subleased back to the City, at no rental, the
courthouse itself, and unused excess air space over 100,000 square feet
of floor area.65 The lease also provided that if the two zoning lots are
not combined, after application by the tenant to the Department of
Buildings, the tenant may abrogate the lease.6 Thus, while not ex-
pressly leasing air rights, the same practical result is achieved.
59 Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip and Jump, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1970,
§ 8, at 1, col. 1; N.Y. Times, May 30, 1970, at 22, col. 1 (editorial).
60 Id. Sher, supra note 56, at 4, col. 3.
61 Morris, Air Rights: Fertile Fields, 163 N.Y.L.J. 72, at 1, col. 4; April 15, 1970, at 1,
col. 4; N.Y. EDUC. LAw §§ 450471 (McKinney Supp. 1969), which establishes the New
York City Educational Construction Fund, providing for the use of air rights in connection
with school construction. It is a state agency with independent financing, which purchases
land for schools and then sells or leases the air rights above the school for either commercial,
residential or manufacturing uses, depending on the district; see Liebman, Development of
Air Rights, 160 N.Y.J. 96, Nov. 15, 1968, at 1, col. 4.
62 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 74-79, 74-792.
63 Enabling resolution of the Board of Estimate enacted October 23, 1969 (Cal. No. 67).
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Sher, at 4, col. 2.
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The enabling resolution of the Board of Estimate7 stated, in part,
as follows:
1. The lease shall be for the entire courthouse premises, including
land and buildings, for a term of seventy-five years .... 68
2. That simultaneously therewith a sublease of the courthouse
building and unused excess airspace over 100,000 square feet of
floor area shall be made to the City for a term of seventy-four
years and 364 days, without rental.
3. That the minimum rental for the lease shall be $35,000 per an-
num for the first ten years, $40,000 per annum for the next fif-
teen years, and $50,000 per annum for the remaining fifty years.
4. That the successful bidder pay full real estate taxes arising out
of the utilization of the leased air space whether the same is re-
flected by separate tax lot or incorporated in the taxes to be
paid on a newly constructed building.
5. That the successful bidder comply with all legal requirements
with respect to the maintenance and preservation of the exist-
ing courthouse building as a landmark building.
The lease itself provides that the Tenant "shall not obtain more
than one hundred thousand (100,000) square feet of floor area from the
zoning lot of the Demised Premises."""
The second illustration concerns the old United States Custom
House at Bowling Green in New York. A developer wished to put up
a 50-story office building across the street at No. 1 Broadway. The zon-
ing law would have restricted him severely without the transfer of air
rights from the Custom House. However, the Custom House was fed-
eral property, and the Zoning Resolution forbade the transfer of air
rights from government property.70 The Zoning Resolution was, con-
sequently, changed.71 It already had permitted the transfer of air rights
from privately-owned landmarks by special permit of the City Planning
0 7Enabling resolution of the Board of Estimate of The City of New York, adopted
October 23, 1969 (Cal. No. 67).
68 This seventy-five year lease provision raises a novel problem. What happens when
the seventy-five year term expires? Modern skyscrapers are generally built to last more than
seventy-five years. At that time, the building will become an illegal building in violation of
the zoning of the lot on which it stands. It seems unlikely that courts will be prepared
to order the partial demolition of major urban buildings. Three possibilities exist: first,
the lease could be renewed; second, a variance could be applied for; or third, and perhaps
most logically, the courts might deem a building in this predicament to be a valid non-
conforming use upon expiration of the leasehold. Real estate lawyers have criticized the
use of the leasehold technique for this reason and prefer the employment of an easement
which successfully avoids the problem.
69 Sher, at 4, col. 2.
70 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 74-79, 74-792, as amended, 74-792(5)(c), May 13, 1970
(Cal. No. 20, CPS-211651).
71 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 74-79, 74-792.
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Commission and the Board of Estimate provided that the bulk of any
new development and the density of population of any block would
not be adversely affected, and the program for continuing maintenance
would result in the preservation of the landmrk.72 Now, the same pro-
cedure is authorized for government-owned landmarks with the further
proviso that the applicant would be required to provide "a major im-
provement of the public pedestrian circulation or transportation sys-
tem in the area. '73
It should be noted that this does not involve contiguous lots, but
lots separated from each other by a city street. In the Custom House
illustration it is only one small step from going across the street to al-
low the zoning or development rights to jump a block or many blocks
or, eventually, clear across town;74 which leads us simply and logically
to the zoning bank which has been proposed in Chicago.
The zoning bank, which has been proposed in Chicago by Profes-
sor John J. Costonis of the University of Illinois College of Law at
Champaign, envisages the designation of certain areas, containing
within their borders landmarks whose preservation is desired, as "pres-
ervation districts." 75 The City would then set up a "development rights
bank." Development rights would be measured in square footage. The
"bank" would receive development rights as a result of transfer to the
bank of development rights over publicly-owned landmarks, donation
by private owners of landmarks (the donation being tax deductible),
and condemnation or purchase by the City of a "preservation easement"
on a privately-owned landmark. This easement would obligate the
owner to refrain from destruction or unauthorized alteration of the
landmark.
The City could sell development rights in the bank, but only
within the same "preservation district," and with use, height and
density districts of the same general character. Proceeds of these sales
would be used to establish a revolving fund to finance the acquisition
by purchase or condemnation of development rights for the bank. A
portion of these funds might also be used for operating subsidies, which,
together with reduced assessments (because of the development rights
having been separated from the property), would enable the landmark
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Burks, City Wants Air Rights to Hop, Skip and Jump, N.Y. Times, April 26, 1970,
§ 8, at 1, col. 9; Elliott, The Development of Downtown Manhattan, 26 Tm REcoRD 833,
838 (Dec. 1971).
75 Costonis & Shlaes, Preservation of Chicago Landmarks Through a Development
Rights Banking Program, Dec. 4, 1970.
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to remain economically viable.76 Alternatively, instead of the City's ac-
quiring and selling the development rights of a newly-designated land-
mark, it would permit the owner to sell the rights within the established
limitations.77
Although the Zoning Bank as proposed to Chicago by Costonis is
oriented toward landmarks and is limited in area to particular districts,
there is no legal or logical reason why it should not be broadened to
encompass all underutilized sites located in developing core areas for
transfer to wherever the rights might effectively be employed, includ-
ing street, highway and railroad rights-of-way as well.78 In any such
proposal, of course, control by the appropriate governmental planning
agency is essential to avoid the emasculation of zoning controls and
distorted developments which are not consistent with the overall com-
prehensive plan.79
Zoning purists would argue that this approach constitutes zoning
"tricksterism" and in terms of traditional learning in the field of zon-
ing, it is guilty of the charge. 0 But it does preserve the overall density
controls established by conventional zoning and merely redistributes
allowed densities in a more controlled and less fortuitous manner.81
With the advent of more intensive and diversified use of air space in
real estate development (viz., our many new multiple use buildings
rising over 50 stories in height and the newest trend in New York and
Chicago to build over 100 stories)82, there is more technological ability
76 Id. Letter from John J. Costonis to Eugene J. Morris, April 13, 1970, on file at Demov,
Morris, Levin & Shein, N.Y., N.Y.
77 Letter from John J. Costonis to Eugene J. Morris, May 6, 1970, on file at Demov,
Morris, Levin & Shein, N.Y., N.Y.
78 Examples of street, highway and railroad rights of way are abundant in the highly
urbanized areas of the country. In New York City, Montefiore Hospital and Maimonides
Hospital have extensions spanning city streets; the Bridge Apartments over the approach
to the George Washington Bridge; and the many buildings built along Park Avenue in
New York City over the Grand Central railroad right of way.
79 Very few states have any statutory controls for the utilization of air space. In New
York City, the Zoning Resolution §§ 74-79 and 74-792 detail the utilization of air space. In
Chicago, the proposal of Professor Costonis for a zoning bank, is still pending. The only
situation where there is a possibility of a Uniform statute is in the form of a draft bill,
prepared by the Bureau of Public Roads. See Recent Developments in Airspace Utilization,
5 RE.AL PROP. PROB. & TRUST J. 347, 361 (1970).
80 Mrs. Beverly Moss Spatt, the respected "maverick" ex-member of the City Planning
Commission, dissented vehemently from the New York Zoning Resolution, concerning trans-
ferring of air rights. She said she did not believe the City should be "selling" zoning rights
to accomplish the transfer of unused landmark air rights. Commenting on the requirement
that the beneficiary of such a transfer must effect a major transportation improvement in
the area, she said, "I do not believe that zoning is the tool to solve the City's fiscal crisis."
As quoted in Sher, at 4, col. 3.
81 N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTON §§ 74-79, 74-792; the proposed "zoning bank" in Chicago;
Sher, at 4, col. 3.
82 World Trade Center in New York, and Hancock and Sears Buildings in Chicago.
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to use the additional flexibility to permit more logical planning and
redevelopment of our urban areas. To add a new arrow to the quiver
of the increasingly complex field of city planning does not in any way
impair existing procedures, but instead augments them into a more
sophisticated set of tools to deal with a situation which the pressures
of modern civilization are rendering more difficult every day. As we have
seen repeatedly throughout the history of our laws - what is legerde-
main one day easily becomes accepted as a part of the fabric of the law
when its utility and effectiveness are established.
It has also been suggested that there is no need for a complicated
technique like the zoning bank when the same result can be accom-
plished by presently available procedures for upzoning8 3, variances84
and zoning bonuses8 5 But this position overlooks the fact that these
techniques increase overall zoning densities whereas the zoning bank
does not - it merely redistributes it.8 s Thus, an entirely different plan-
ning function is dealt with in the zoning bank which is not avaliable
under any of the other urban zoning techniques. It is more akin to the
floating zone 87 used in rural and subdivision planning and, like it, of-
fers a flexibility not found in conventional rigid zoning patterns.88
Moreover, the statutory standards for each of these techniques for vary-
ing the zoning governing a site or an area are based upon different con-
siderations and factors.
The zoning bank in governed by the criteria that:
83 "Upzoning" is the act of changing the zoning classification of an area from a given
density or a given floor-area ratio to one of higher density or a higher floor-area ratio,
N.Y.C. ZONING RESOLUTION §§ 73-60 to 73-70.
84 "A variance is an authorization for the construction or maintenance of a building
or structure, or for the establishment or maintenance of a use of land, which is prohibited
by a zoning ordinance. It is a right granted by a board of adjustment pursuant to power
vested.. . by statute... and is a form of administrative relief from the ... strict applica-
tion of zoning regulation." 2 ANDER.SON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 14.02 at 593 (1968).
85 "Zoning bonuses" are special increments of floor-area ratio above the normal maxi-
mum for an area given to a building in return for specified deeds, e.g., backing the building
away from the lot line, and providing for pedestrian malls and fountains. Examples of this
are the Lincoln Square and Theatre Districts, as well as the recently approved Fifth Avenue
Special District, where buildings will be of multiple use, i.e., commercial and residential
combined in a single structure. N.Y.C. ZONING REsOLUTION §§ 81-00 to 81-06, 82-00 to 82-11.
86 Costonis & Shlaes, Preservation of Chicago Landmarks Through a Development
Rights Banking Program, Dec. 4, 1970.
87 "[A] technique where a particular category of uses was identified in the text of a
zoning ordinance but no equivalent area was found on the map. Given the 'right' proposal
put forward by the 'right' developer, this textual reference would descend from the
firmament and settle on the lucky owner's land." Babcock, THE ZONING GAMsE, MuNIcnPAL
PRACrICEs AND Porioms 8 (1966).
88 Miss Porters' School, Inc. v. Town Plan and Zoning Comm'n of the Town of
Framington, 151 Conn. 425, 198 A.2d 707 (1964); Eves v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment of
Lower Gwynedd Township, 401 Pa. 211, 164 A.2d 7 (1960).
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a) all transfers must be within the same preservation district;
b) all transfers must be between use, height and density districts of
the same general character; and
c) a flexible ceiling on the amount of density allowed on any trans-
ferred area over and above the normal density for that area has
been proposed by the author of the concept.8 9
The transfer of zoning or development rights has also been criti-
cized as constituting spot zoning. 0 Spot zoning is defined as "the pro-
cess of singling out a small parcel of land for a use classification totally
different from that of the surrounding area, for the benefit of the owner
of such property and to the detriment of other owners." 91
The transferring of air space in New York under the Zoning Reso-
lution, and the contemplated "zoning bank" legislation in Chicago
confer no special zone to the detriment of the owner's neighbors. The
New York and Chicago statutes do not envision selling air rights from
a landmark to a two-acre plot in the suburbs for the erection of a 40-
story office tower.
The transferring of airspace is occurring in specified density dis-
tricts, to avoid any cries of spot zoning. Even if, however, the airspace
were transferred to an area of different density, this would still not con-
stitute spot zoning if it were done in conformance with a comprehensive
plan.92 However, this objection seems moot, since the contemplation
of both the New York statute and the proposed Chicago statute envi-
sions only the preservation of landmarks and/or a place to continue
urban growth - i.e., building up.
80 Costonis & Shlaes, Preservation of Chicago Landmarks Through a Development
Rights Banking Program, Dec. 4, 1970.
00 Harris v. City of Piedmont, 5 Cal. App. 2d 146, 42 P.2d 356 (1935); People v. Cohen,
272 N.Y. 319, 5 N.E.2d 835 (1936); Cassel v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 73 A.2d
486. For example, erx-Commissioner Spatt, referring to the lease of air rights over the
Appellate Division Courthouse, said, "This leasing is accomplished without referring the
matter to the Planning Commission and, in actuality, makes today's text change meaningless
and superfluous. Leasing and selling air rights in such ad hoc manner is nothing but
spot zoning. It can only lead to an unplanned future- to chaos." As quoted in Sher,
at 4, col. 8.
91 Rogers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N.Y. 115, 123, 96 NXE.2d 731, 734 (1951).
92 Shepard v. Village of Skaneateles, 800 N.Y. 115, 89 N.E.2d 619 (1949); Nappi v. La-
Guardia, 295 N.Y. 652, 64 N.E2.d 716 (1945); Marshall v. Salt Lake City, 105 Utah 111, 141
P.2d 704 (1943).
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